

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 5, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
FROM: J. Kent Fortenberry / Joe Sanders
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending September 5, 1997

Mike Merritt was on-site this week observing meetings of the complex-wide task force for the Nuclear Materials Processing Needs Assessment. This task force is addressing the 6/9/97 Huizenga memorandum concerning SRS processing needs.

Stabilizing Sand, Slag & Crucible (SS&C) in F-Canyon - WSRC successfully completed its line management assessment of F-Canyon readiness to dissolve SS&C from the FB-Line Vault. The SS&C will be repackaged in FB-Line and transferred to F-Canyon for dissolving. The resulting plutonium solutions will be converted to metal in the FB-Line. The first dissolver charge should occur early next week. Processing of onsite SS&C will continue through 1998. Similar processing of SS&C from RFETS is likely, and would probably begin in the spring of 1998.

Tritium Loading Line 6 - This loading line is being established within Building 233-H (formerly RTF). Similar to the operating loading lines, reservoir overpressurization during filling is a concern due to the possibility of an energetic rupture which could breach the glovebox and release the reservoir contents to the room. The controls to prevent overpressurization include rupture disks, which relieve to relief tanks, and operator monitoring of pressure. Additionally, the relief tanks have redundant interlocks to shutdown the associated compressor on high tank pressure. During the design of Loading Line 6, it was determined that if a valve between the compressor and the reservoir was inappropriately closed and then opened, the resulting pressure transient could damage the line and/or the installed reservoir. An orifice was added to prevent this condition. The site reps are evaluating whether this scenario could impact the currently operating loading lines.

Comprehensive Deactivation, Decontamination and Decommissioning Strategy/Plan - As previously reported (7/25/97 weekly report), DOE-SR asked WSRC to develop a plan for a "financially self-sustaining" deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning program. The recent WSRC response suggested several concepts to achieve this objective, namely: (1) using future savings from reductions in surveillance & maintenance costs to fund additional facility disposition projects, (2) using funds from surplus equipment/material sales to offset disposition costs, and (3) identifying alternative funding sources such as funding available from DOE-HQ integration efforts. To address the issue of risk-based prioritization (see 7/25/97 weekly report), WSRC committed to develop a site-wide priority list in FY98. A major component in establishing priority will be risk ranking to identify potential deactivation and/or decommissioning actions that could be undertaken to reduce risk and the current costs of managing those risks.